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Abstract An emergent paradigm, referred to as Open Economy Politics (OEP), now
structures and guides research among many scholars. This essay sketches the general
contours of the paradigm. Scientific accumulation is, in my view, the potential and
great benefit of a self-conscious understanding of OEP as a single, unifying
paradigm. The essay also provides a sympathetic critique of OEP and shows how the
paradigm can be extended to capture some of the concerns and insights of other
critics. Most important, this critique highlights the role and consequences of certain
simplifying assumptions commonly used in OEP and calls for a closer examination
of how international institutions and policies structure and change the interests of
actors within countries that are now taken as exogenous.
Keywords Political economy . Globalization . Institutions . Bargaining .
Optimal tariffs . Economies of scale
JEL Codes F02 . F13 . F50 . F59
1 Introduction
The world has become “globalized.” Among developed countries, international trade
now accounts for approximately 40% of gross domestic product (GDP), and for
developing countries imports plus exports comprise nearly 50% of all national
output. Over the last two decades, global flows of foreign direct investment have
more than doubled relative to GDP. The financial crisis that began in the United
States in September 2008 quickly became a global crisis, essentially plunging
Iceland into bankruptcy within days. As journalist Thomas Friedman (2000, 9) has
famously described it, globalization now allows “individuals, corporations, and
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nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever
before.”
The field of international political economy (IPE) was created in the early 1970s
by scholars trying to grasp the fundamentals of this nascent age. From a range of
early perspectives, an emergent paradigm, referred to as Open Economy Politics
(OEP), now structures and guides research among many scholars.1 Yet, although
OEP is widely practiced, it has not been synthesized or, even less, codified as a
coherent research program. Some scholars may not recognize that they are part of
this emerging paradigm even though their research is central to it. One purpose of
this essay is to sketch the general contours of the paradigm and to suggest how
different streams of research are actually complementary and, in fact, contribute to a
single, more powerful scholarly river. By understanding the contours of the emergent
paradigm, it is easier to connect pieces of research and, in turn, to build cumulative
knowledge. OEP helps identify what we know, what we think we know, and what
we do not know. Scientific accumulation is, in my view, the potential and great
benefit of a self-conscious understanding of OEP as a single, unifying paradigm.
All paradigms, however, privilege certain assumptions, methods, and epistemol-
ogies over others. This is the inevitable and unavoidable cost of greater
accumulation made possible by those same assumptions, methods, and epistemol-
ogies. Some fear the “intellectual mono-culture” that any paradigm implies; better to
have many competing and usually incommensurate approaches, in this view, than
to pick the wrong (or perhaps any) paradigm.2 A second purpose of this essay is to
provide a sympathetic critique of OEP and show how the paradigm as it is now
emerging can be extended to capture some of the concerns and insights of other
approaches. Although now conceived in somewhat narrow terms, OEP is broader
and potentially more flexible than some of its proponents and certainly its critics
imply.
As is no doubt already evident, I am of “two minds” in this essay.3 At the same
time as I seek to describe the emergent paradigm of OEP, I also aim to extend and
enlarge it in useful ways.4 To the extent that my critique is persuasive, proponents
may well charge that I described the paradigm too narrowly in the first place. In turn,
more strident critics may well retort that any such extensions only show that OEP is
not and perhaps should not be accepted as a paradigm. Accepting that the task is
difficult and likely to prove unsatisfactory to many, I nonetheless try to walk the fine
line between these two positions.
1 I use the concept paradigm here in the sense of Kuhn (1970), not in the looser sense normally used in
political science as a school of thought. Indeed, in Kuhn’s view, the existence of many competing schools
is prima facie evidence of a pre-scientific or non-paradigmatic research program. The term OEP comes
from Bates (1997).
2 The phrase is from McNamara (2009). For defenses of intellectual pluralism, see the debate over the
Atlantic divide in IPE, and especially Cohen (2007), Phillips (2009), Wade (2009), and Katzenstein
(2009).
3 On the “two minds” problem in IPE, see Weaver (2009).
4 Although I have been accused of being a “triumphalist” advocate of OEP (Cohen 2009, 140), my own
research does not fall neatly into the paradigm as it now exists. Indeed, this outsider’s stance motivates
much of my critique of OEP in the final section of this essay. I do, however, prize scientific accumulation
and work within the broader strategic choice approach of which OEP is a subset. See Lake and Powell
(1999). For an attempt to outline this strategic choice approach at a general level, see Frieden et al. (2009).
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IPE and specifically OEP have been intimately linked with the study of
international organizations, the focus of this journal. Some of the earliest theoretical
work on international regimes focused on the world economy, where intuition
suggested that such institutions were likely to be particularly consequential (Krasner
1983; Keohane 1984). As the study of international institutions has matured, the
field has attempted to move beyond IPE and become a more general theory, with
successful applications to the environment, human rights, and even security. At the
same time, however, the field has narrowed its purview to how and when institutions
“matter” and is increasingly focused on the rules of particular institutions. OEP
reminds scholars that even international institutions are but one part of a broader
political process, and that their role and effects can be fully understood only in that
context. A third purpose of this essay, then, is to suggest that OEP provides a model
of how international institutions can be studied and understood from within an
integrated theoretical approach.
This article provides an overview of IPE theory with particular attention to the
role of international institutions. It begins with a brief outline of the early origins of
the field, and then provides a survey of OEP. In Section 4, I offer a sympathetic
critique of the emergent paradigm that aims to integrate concerns of some critics and
identify the agenda for future research. Most important, this critique highlights the
role and consequences of certain simplifying assumptions commonly used in OEP
and calls for a closer examination of how international institutions and policies
structure and change the interests of actors within countries that are now taken as
exogenous. By relaxing these peripheral assumptions within OEP, I show how the
emergent paradigm can address at least some of the criticisms raised by less
sympathetic commentators.
2 International Political Economy
IPE focuses on the politics of international economic exchange. It is a substantive
area of inquiry, rather than merely a methodology in which economic models are
applied to political phenomena. The field is primarily informed by two sets of key
questions. First, how, when, and why do countries choose to open themselves to
transborder flows of goods and services, capital, and people? In other words, what
are the political determinants of what we now call globalization? In this first set of
questions, openness is the dependent variable, or outcome to be explained, and
politics (defined broadly) is the independent or causal variable. Economic theory
posits that free and unrestricted international commerce is, with limited exceptions,
welfare improving; many politically naïve analysts, in turn, expect countries to
evolve toward free trade. By contrast, IPE begins with the reality that openness is
historically rare, problematic, and a phenomenon that itself needs to be explained.
Second, how does integration (or not) into the international economy affect the
interests of individuals, sectors, factors of production, or countries and, in turn,
national policies? Here, politics is the dependent variable and how the actor is
situated in the international economy is the independent variable. In reality, of
course, these two sets of questions are themselves integrated. For pragmatic
purposes, however, nearly all analysts study just one half of the causal circle.
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2.1 Origins
Although these questions were central to political economists of the late 18th and
early 19th centuries, they fell into an intellectual limbo with the split between
economics and political science into two separate disciplines in the late 19th
century.5 As economics underwent the “marginalist” revolution and slowly
transformed itself into an axiomatic science and political science turned to the study
of formal-legal constitutions and institutions, both disciplines grew increasingly
introspective. Questions concerning the political foundations of markets and the
economics of politics were left to languish—or were happily consigned to Marxists
who were largely ostracized from both professional disciplines in Europe and North
America.6
IPE emerged as a new and distinct interdisciplinary field beginning in the late-
1960s and early-1970s as a result of two real world developments.7 Together, these
trends forced scholars to grapple anew with the same questions that had occupied
earlier political economists. First, the success of the postwar Western international
economic regime constructed at Bretton Woods and embodied in the postwar
institutions of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), ushered in an era of increasing economic
interdependence. By the end of the 1960s, as the tariff cuts negotiated at the
Kennedy Round of the GATT took full effect, trade as a proportion of economic
activity began to rise rapidly in all advanced industrialized democracies, leading to a
new focus on the political impact of deepening economic ties (Cooper 1968;
Keohane and Nye 1972). This new era was expected by some to transform the nature
of international politics, with economic historian Charles Kindleberger (1969, 207)
famously proclaiming that “the nation-state is just about through as an economic
unit” and political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) unveiling a new
model of international politics characterized by “complex interdependence” and
international regimes. We now recognize this surge of interdependence as the first
stirrings of the present era of globalization, more frequently dated from the removal
of capital controls in many developed economies in the early 1980s. Many today still
believe that globalization carries the same transformative potential.
Second, at nearly the same time that interdependence was accelerating, the
political foundations of this open international economy began to crack, revealing
for all that economic exchange rested on unstable political ground. In August 1971,
facing the huge dollar “overhang” first theorized by economist Robert Triffin (1960)
and the consequences of a decade of fiscal and monetary mismanagement, President
Richard Nixon formally ended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, closing the
door on the Bretton Woods regime (Gowa 1983). Two years later, the postwar
exchange rate regime collapsed when the major currencies began to float against one
another. Contributing to this monetary instability, the Arab boycott begun during the
5 For an analysis of the early years of political economy and its trajectory, see Caporaso and Levine
(1992).
6 The hostility to Marxism at least in the United States continued to inhibit the growth of IPE into the
1970s. Gourevitch (1977) was originally rejected by a leading journal of international relations as
“Marxist claptrap.” Personal communication.
7 For an extended treatment of the origins of IPE, see Cohen (2008).
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1973 Middle East war transformed oil into a coercive weapon. Breathing life into the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), first formed in 1960, the
factious states began to operate effectively as a cartel, raising oil prices fifteen fold
between 1973 and 1980. Envying OPEC’s success, even while suffering under
higher oil prices, the developing world called for a New International Economic
Order through which other commodity producers hoped to exercise similar market
power with the acquiescence or hopefully support of Northern consumers (see
Krasner 1985). Finally, in response to the growth of imports unleashed by
liberalization and rising interdependence, American industry began clamoring for
increased or renewed trade protection. Trying to satisfy industry without under-
mining its commitment to free trade, the United States adopted a series of innovative
non-tariff barriers to trade including “voluntary export restraints,” directed primarily
at Japan (Goldstein 1988). As international economic relations were politicized, it
became apparent that international exchange was not an autonomous sphere—a
natural phenomenon beyond political machinations—but was itself a product of the
pulling and hauling of politics within and between countries. Just as property rights
later came to be understood as both central to economic growth and a product of
redistributive politics within countries, early international political economists
realized that an open international economy rested on highly contested national
policy decisions (Gilpin 1972). As analysts struggled to understand the simultaneous
growth and conflict in international markets, the field of IPE was born.
There were three main strains of theory in the initial blossoming of IPE.8
Dependency theory, founded by Latin American scholars writing in the 1960s and
popular in North America and Europe in the 1970s, was unified by the idea that the
economy and prospects for development in poor countries (the periphery) are
conditioned by a global economy dominated by already developed states (the core).9
In the view of Andre Gunder Frank (1966), one of the more strident advocates of the
approach, today’s poor countries are not just undeveloped, as had been the case for
core countries centuries earlier, but are underdeveloped by an international economy
that is forever biased against them. Dependency theory tapped into issues of
international inequality, uneven growth, and national control over international
economic forces that remain central to contemporary debates about globalization.
Even if today dependency theory is broadly rejected, the real world concerns that
lent it credence endure.
Hegemonic stability theory, based largely on the experiences of Great Britain in
the mid-19th and the United States in the mid-20th centuries, posited that a single
hegemonic state is necessary and sufficient for international economic openness to
arise.10 Kindleberger (1973, 305) first identified a series of what we would now call
international market failures that caused the Great Depression of the 1930s, and
concluded “that for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer,
one stabilizer.” Others in this approach posited that large dominant states possess
strong preferences for free and open international exchange and, in turn, coerce,
8 An alternative typology divides theories into Marxist, Liberal, and Realist approaches. See Gilpin
(1975).
9 The cornerstone of dependency theory is (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), first published in Spanish in 1967.
An early approach was Prebisch (1964). See also Marini (1972), Furtado (1973), and Sunkel (1969).
10 The theory is reviewed in greater detail in Lake (1993).
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induce, or persuade other states into opening their markets to foreign trade and
investment (Gilpin 1975, 1977; Krasner 1976). Although plausible, these alternative
intuitions did not produce a body of well-specified theory. Nonetheless, hegemonic
stability theory called attention to the role of great powers and political power more
generally in determining the nature and extent of globalization.
A final early approach to IPE focused on domestic interests, largely in the
advanced industrialized economies and, especially, the United States.11 Practical
observers of politics and, of course, scholars as early as E. E. Schattschneider (1935)
had emphasized the importance of interest groups in trade policy. Yet, domestic
theories of international political economy emerged only in the mid-1970s. An early
foundation was Kindleberger’s (1951) essay on Group Behavior and International
Trade, followed by, in political science, Peter Gourevitch’s (1977) study of the first
great depression and, in economics, Richard Caves’ (1976) evocative rendering of
different models of trade policy-making.12 Key to much of this work was the
differential ability of actors to solve their collective action problems and then build
majority coalitions with, ultimately, importers triumphing politically over exporters,
producers over consumers, and concentrated over diffuse interests. Less important
than how groups define their interests (see below) was how they are structured and
organized for political action.
Although each was promising, these early approaches did not cumulate in any
meaningful sense. They adopted different units of analysis: classes, nation-states,
and sectors, respectively. They posited different interests—class struggle, national
interests, and economic well-being—that could not be aggregated or disaggregated
one into the other; national interests, for example, were not simply the sum of the
economic interests of a country’s sectors, or vice versa.13 In turn, they produced very
different sorts of explanations. Although hegemonic stability theory appeared to
comport with the evolution of national trade policies over time and the general
pattern of openness or closure in the international economy, for instance, it was silent
on tariff rates across sectors at any moment in time, and even as the domestic interests
approach explained the latter, it was largely unable to explain the former. While there
was lots of theoretical ferment—these were, indeed, intellectually heady years (see
Keohane 2009)—there was little accumulation of knowledge across the field.
3 Open Economy Politics
Out of these early currents, and as a direct descendent of the domestic interests
approach, OEP emerged as a nascent paradigm of IPE by the late 1990s. OEP adopts
11 Complementing this domestic interest group approach, at least in political science, is a domestic
structures model that seeks to characterize and capture institutional variations across developed countries
(Katzenstein 1978; Ikenberry et al. 1988).
12 In the ferment of the early years of IPE, political scientists built on these works to construct a demand-
side or societal-based theory of trade policy (McKeown 1984; Cassing et al. 1986; Frieden 1988b; Milner
1988). At about this same time, economists developed a parallel “endogenous tariff theory” which also
emphasizes the importance of domestic interests and lobbying (Pincus 1975; Lavergne 1983; Baldwin
1985; Magee et al. 1989).
13 For an important statement of this problem, see Krasner (1978).
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the assumptions of neoclassical economics and international trade theory. But by
incorporating political variables more explicitly into its analysis, OEP provides a
bridge between economics and political science—although the span is not yet fully
closed. It also accords a central explanatory role to institutions at both the domestic
and international levels lacking in its predecessors.
OEP begins with individuals, sectors, or factors of production as the units of
analysis and derives their interests over economic policy from each unit’s position
within the international economy. It conceives of domestic political institutions as
mechanisms that aggregate interests (with more or less bias) and structure the
bargaining of competing societal groups. Finally, it introduces, when necessary,
bargaining between states with different interests. Analysis within OEP proceeds
from the most micro- to the most macro-level in a linear and orderly fashion,
reflecting an implicit uni-directional conception of politics as flowing up from
individuals to interstate bargaining.14
Few theorists give equal weight to all steps in this analysis. Most focus on one
step—for instance, how institutions aggregate societal interests—and treat others in
“reduced form,” or as analytic simplifications that are unmodeled in the specific
theory at hand. For tractability, scholars focus on one or another step in the process
and bracket many obviously varying features of a political-economic environment
by treating them as exogenous for purposes of isolating and studying a single causal
effect.15 One might, for instance, bracket where interests “come from” and study
how variable features of domestic institutions aggregate these interests in different
ways. In this way, OEP adopts a partial equilibrium or comparative statics approach
to theory and knowledge. Employing the classic hypothetico-deductive method,
testable hypotheses thus take the form of all else held constant a change in X leads
to a change in Y. In reality, of course, all else is not constant, and various research
designs are employed to deal with problems of causal inference created by this
background variation.16 In principle, however, the broadly shared assumptions allow
the components to be connected together into a more complete whole, although in
practice synthesis remains imperfect.
OEP has made substantial progress. Like any paradigm, it guides research by
specifying what is known and unknown, what is fact and anomaly. Originally
formulated in the context of trade policy, OEP has been extended to monetary and
financial relations (Frieden 1988a, 1991; Bernhard et al. 2003), foreign direct
investment (Jensen 2006; Pinto and Pinto 2008), immigration (Leblang et al. 2007),
foreign aid (Milner 2006), regulation (Mattli and Woods 2009; Richards 1999),
corporate governance (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005), and global governance (Kahler
14 In this way, OEP is a subset of Liberalism, as described by Moravcsik (1997).
15 Lake and Powell (1999) refer to this as a “boxes-within-boxes” approach.
16 For scholars working within OEP, a satisfying explanation requires a rigorous and logically specified
theory and an appropriately designed test that maximizes variation in the causal variable while controlling
for possibly confounding effects. Few studies fully meet this standard, and thus research continues to
refine the implications of theory and explore alternative research designs. But in general, scholars sharing
this epistemology are willing to sacrifice empirical richness and context for (1) more parsimonious but
therefore more fully specified theories, and (2) more narrow but therefore more easily controlled empirical
tests. A satisfying explanation in this tradition is one that “knows” well specified causal relationships with
some degree of certainty. For a contrast with “British” or constructivist approaches to IPE, see Lake
(2009).
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and Lake 2003). It now forms a comprehensive approach to explaining a large range
of foreign economic policies.
3.1 Interests
The fundamental building block of OEP is interest, or how an individual or group is
affected by a particular policy. In what may now be regarded as the canonical model
of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994, 2002), actors that benefit from a
policy are expected to expend resources in the political arena to obtain that policy (as
a shorthand, to lobby) up to the point where the marginal cost of that effort equals
the marginal benefit (defined either as “more” of the policy or an increased
probability of obtaining a fixed policy). Conversely, actors that lose from a policy
are expected to lobby against it. In short, politics is fundamentally about winners and
losers from alternative policies.
Theories differ in what they assume to be the relevant unit of analysis. Although
nearly all theories are fundamentally individualist, for pragmatic purposes theorists
bundle individuals into groups that can be reasonably assumed to share (nearly)
identical interests. In other words, when a policy affects a set of individuals in the
same way, they are typically treated as if they constitute a homogenous group or, for
purposes of analysis, a single actor. In some OEP theories, individuals are primary
but in most firms, sectors, or factors of production are taken to be the relevant units.
OEP uses economic theory to deduce what types of individuals can be reasonably
assumed to share identical interests. A key divide within the approach is between the
Ricardo-Viner or specific factors theory of international trade, which assumes that,
typically, capital and labor are fixed in particular occupations and, thus, will tend to
have similar interests over economic policy, and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) theory of international trade, which assumes that all factors are mobile across
occupations within countries and, therefore, capital and labor will possess opposing
interests. Stephen Magee (1980) attempted to discern which assumption was more
appropriate by studying the lobbying behavior of capital and labor in the trade bill of
1973, and found support for the specific factors approach in his observation that
capital and labor almost always testified on the same side of the proposed legislation.
This implied that sectors were the appropriate unit of analysis for theories of trade
policy.17 Alternatively, Michael Hiscox (2002) used cross-industry variations in rates
of return as a proxy for factor mobility. In his small sample of industrialized
countries, he finds that for the late 19th to the mid-20th centuries, as mass
production was introduced, factor mobility for capital and labor generally increased,
and from the mid-20th century until today factor mobility has generally decreased,
which in turn is broadly confirmed by the changing structure of political interests on
trade over the last century. This implies that the relevant units evolved from sectors,
to factors, and back to sectors over the course of the last century or more.
Having defined the relevant unit of analysis, OEP goes further to derive interests—
preferences over alternative policies—from the distributional implications of alterna-
tive economic policies and, in turn, how a group is located relative to others in the
17 Baldwin and Magee (2000) find more support for the HOS model.
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international economy.18 Firms vary by whether they are in the tradable or non-
tradable sectors, produce import-competing or export-competing goods, use imported
components, and so on. By knowing a firm’s “production profile,” as Gourevitch
(1986) termed it, OEP predicts how it will be affected, for instance, by policies to
increase international openness. Sectors vary by similar characteristics. Factors of
production, in turn, vary by their scarcity relative to the world economy (Stolper and
Samuelson 1941; Rogowski 1989). Using Mundell’s (1957) equivalence condition—
that flows of goods and factors across international borders are equivalent in their
effects on relative rates of return—we can derive expectations about how factors will
be affected by a large range of economic policies and, thus, identify their interests over
those same policies.
Deducing interests from economic theory was a fundamental innovation for OEP,
one that makes the approach unique in political economy. Rather than treating them
simply by assumption or inferring them from the political actions to be explained,
interests are derived from a prior, falsifiable, and empirically robust theory—putting
the whole approach on a sound deductive footing. It is on this innovation that the
distinctive nature and, indeed, explanatory power of OEP rests. That both the
relevant political actors and their interests are defined by their production profile or
position in the international economy is the “hard core” of the emergent paradigm.19
3.2 Domestic Institutions
Institutions aggregate conflicting societal interests, with varying degrees of bias, and
condition the bargaining between opposing groups. In weakly institutionalized political
systems, like the international system or “failed states,” coercive strength is expected to
determine political outcomes; on average, and simplifying somewhat, we expect the
side with the most guns to win. In highly institutionalized settings, like most domestic
political systems, established rules and procedures generally reflect group strength over
the long term. But because they often do other valuable things for society, like enhance
the credibility of commitments, institutions can develop an independent standing and
structure, channel, and sometimes offset brute force in the short term. At any moment,
institutions serve to define what political power means in a particular society, whether
the competition over policy will be conducted via votes, normally expected to favor
labor, via contributions and bribes, often in capital’s comparative advantage, or via ideas
and argument. In short, institutions determine the “currency” used in the political
marketplace and how different political assets are valued.
Political scientists and, increasingly, economists are studying in detail how
domestic institutions aggregate interests. OEP is consistent with and draws heavily
on the literature on comparative political institutions, much of which is not connected
immediately to economic policy (see Cox 1997; Tsebelis 2002). There are many
diverse strains in this literature, but among the more relevant findings for IPE are:
& Large constituencies—at the extreme, a single electoral district for the entire
country—incline policy towards the general welfare, assumed to be the free
18 On studying preferences more generally, see Frieden (1999).
19 On hard core and peripheral assumptions in paradigms, see Lakatos (1978).
Open economy politics: a critical review 227
flow of goods, services, and factors of production, while small constituencies
bias policy toward more protectionist groups (Rogowski 1987).
& The more veto points within a political system (actors with the authority to block
the enactment of policy), the more likely the status quo is to prevail, reducing the
credibility of any promise to adopt political or economic reforms (Cowhey 1993)
and, at the same time, reducing the ability of a government to respond effectively
to external shocks (MacIntyre 2001).
& Institutionalized legislative participation in foreign policy decision-making
provides both the national executive and foreign partners with better information,
reducing the problem of reneging on agreements, and additional checks (veto
points) on policy change, enhancing credibility and prospects for cooperation
(Martin 2000).
& Proportional representation systems produce policy stability and inflexibility,
implying less credible commitments to reform and less ability to respond
effectively to external shocks, whereas majoritarian electoral systems tend
toward policy flexibility and instability, with the opposite effects on credibility
and effective response (Rogowski 1999).
Our understanding of how institutions aggregate interests is far more advanced
for democracies than for democratizing or autocratic states. Interest aggregation
in non-democratic or newly democratic states remains an important area for
future research.
Institutions also condition the bargaining between groups, largely by setting the
reversion point for policy in the absence of some compromise and defining possible
sidepayments, cross-issue deals, and logrolls. For instance, Peter Katzenstein (1985)
argues that the small open economies of Europe developed corporatist institutions to
facilitate economic adjustment, capital-labor cooperation to moderate wage
demands, and compensatory social welfare systems to ease the costs to individuals
of economic adversity. Dani Rodrik (1997), Geoffrey Garrett (1998), and others have
generalized this argument to all states, finding substantial evidence of an “embedded
liberal” compromise (Ruggie 1983) in which social welfare policies are the cost
capital pays for economic openness. Similarly, multimember electoral districts, as in
Japan, promote particularistic interests and policies, creating socially inefficient rent-
seeking and economic inflexibility (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993).
OEP recognizes, in a way that the earlier domestic interests approach did not, that
interests are central but not enough. However well specified, interests are refracted
through political institutions that often have an independent effect on policy choices.
What remains distinctive about OEP, however, is its insistence on explicit theorizing
of both interests and institutions.
3.3 International Bargaining
With domestic interests aggregated through institutions into a national “policy”—or,
more accurately, a national ideal point—states then bargain when necessary to
influence one another’s behavior and to determine the joint outcome of their actions.
International institutions, in turn, condition how this bargaining takes place and what
outcomes are reached. This is the third and final step in the OEP approach.
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International bargaining is most likely to arise when the policies of one state
create externalities for others (Milner 1997b). In many situations, externalities arise
from the collective choices of many small economic actors. In these so-called market
failures, individually optimal choices lead to collectively suboptimal results. These
are well studied dilemmas, even if they remain difficult to resolve.20 Even when they
are not directly affected by the actions of others, states may also promote
international norms and may be willing to pay some price to gain adherents or
alter the behavior of possible violators. The effort to promote the “Washington
Consensus” on development may be one example of norm driven behavior in the
IPE (Stiglitz 2002), and attempts to regulate child sex tourism a possible second
(Martin 2003).21 Nonetheless, most theories of IPE continue to assume that
bargaining occurs mostly as a result of some material externality.
Much research in OEP focuses on how international institutions, like their
domestic counterparts, structure bargaining and affect outcomes. There are
essentially two approaches that, as Stephen D. Krasner (1991) reminds us, capture
different but complementary dimensions of the bargaining game. The first, often
referred to as neoliberal institutionalism, sees institutions as sets of rules that
facilitate cooperation. By providing information, creating issue linkages, and
reducing transactions costs, institutions help states reach Pareto-improving bargains
(Keohane 1984; Bagwell and Staiger 2002). Current research in OEP has moved
well beyond the sterile debates that dominated political science in the 1990s over
whether international institutions “matter,” and now focuses on how institutions are
designed to achieve the aims of member states.22
Particularly important is how states enhance the credibility of their commitments
through institutions. Since all agreements must be self-enforcing, international
cooperation is possible only when agreements are credible, or in the interests of all
parties to carry out under future circumstances. Much of the work on this problem
has focused on the issue of sovereign debt, but is easily generalized to other types of
transactions. Michael Tomz (2007) looks at the time inconsistency problem in
international lending when there is uncertainty about the borrower’s willingness to
repay, and how states use (and abuse) reputations to solve this problem. Randall
Stone (2002) examines the enforcement problem in sovereign lending, which arises
when lenders have political incentives not to publish borrowers who default on their
commitments. More directly institutional, Xinyuan Dai (2007) argues that even
“weak” international institutions empower non-state and domestic actors to provide
information and improve state compliance with international rules. J. Lawrence Broz
(2002) finds that states that lack domestic transparency and cannot otherwise commit
credibly to monetary stability are more likely to fix their exchange rates.
20 Among others, see Frey (1984, Chapter 7) and Sandler (1997).
21 We can convert normative principles into externalities simply by adding into an individual’s utility
function a desire, say, not to see children exploited. Yet when there is no direct or indirect impact on a
person’s welfare other than through the unobservable normative principle, the concept of externality is
stretched almost to the breaking point. Nearly any observed behavior can then be “explained” by appeal to
externalities.
22 See Goldstein et al. (2001) and Koremenos et al. (2003). A slightly different approach examines how
states construct international organizations as agents to facilitate their aims. See Hawkins et al. (2006).
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A second institutionalist approach focuses on bargaining over the gains from
cooperation. If the first approach sees institutions as moving states closer to the
Pareto frontier, this school emphasizes (the zero sum) movement along the frontier.
As in most bargaining models, the key variables in this redistributive game are the
relative cost of the reservation point to the parties, their time horizons (discount
rates), and their ability to make credible threats and promises. James Fearon (1998)
demonstrates that a long “shadow of the future,” which in the first approach
promotes cooperation via the folk theorem, can also inhibit cooperation by raising
the stakes over which the parties are bargaining.
In focusing on distributional conflict, this second line of inquiry implies that
cooperation may not necessarily improve social welfare. The logic parallels ideas
first developed in the Chicago school of economic regulation (Stigler 1971;
Peltzman 1976). Groups may use their national governments to create international
institutions that limit competition and produce rents they can appropriate. Robert
Bates (1997) describes the International Coffee Organization as a cartel of large
coffee producers allied with the large coffee roasters in developed countries that
limited supply and raised prices at the expense of coffee consumers. John Richards
(1999) finds similar cartel-like behavior in the international aviation regime. In this
literature, institutions are understood largely to codify and lock-in outcomes that
favor one country or group of countries over another.
Together, interests, institutions, and international bargaining explain the choice of
policies by countries and the outcomes experienced by the world economy. As
suggested, OEP proceeds towards an explanation in a linear, unidirectional fashion.
Although any one analysis may focus more or less on a single step in the causal
chain, any complete explanation begins with interests, proceeds to examine the role
of domestic institutions, and concludes with bargaining in international institutions
and, then, ultimately the policy or outcome to be explained. As I shall argue below,
this linear structure of the theory also forms one of its principle limitations.
3.4 Why Success?
OEP has arisen as an emergent paradigm in the field of IPE for three reasons. We
should not lose sight of these reasons as the approach matures. First, OEP is
disciplined by a strong empirical foundation. From its inception, IPE has focused on
historical trends in the international economy, both political and economic. Analysts
have generally been careful not to mistake a single cross-section for all possible
states of the world, but have mined the rich history available to them to test their
theories. In turn, considerable attention has been devoted to developing appropriate
indicators of trade protection, non-tariff barriers to trade, exchange rate regimes, and
so on. Where IPE was originally constrained to case studies or, at best, statistical
tests based on very limited data, some of the best new research employs very large
time series datasets and powerful econometric tools. Whatever the method, however,
IPE remains a strongly empirical science.
Second, OEP emphasizes deductive rigor. Political scientists, especially, have
benefited from powerful theories developed in economics. Economists, in turn, have
been prompted to take politics and political institutions seriously, and to integrate
realistic understandings of political processes into their models. Scholarly debate has
230 D.A. Lake
forced all to clarify the assumptions they make, revealing strengths and limitations,
and to state propositions in clear and falsifiable ways, thereby opening arguments to
empirical test. By working within agreed standards of scientific inquiry, scholarly
interactions and cumulative knowledge are facilitated.
Finally, OEP draws upon and is integrated into broader bodies of theory. Theorists
have grounded their analyses in the pure theory of international trade, theories of
collective action, and theories of political institutions—all developed in larger
disciplines and for other purposes. This not only links OEP to broader research
programs and facilitates cross-fertilization, but prevents analysts from reinventing the
wheel each time they sit down at their computers. Norms of theoretical rigor
disciplined by empirical facts are now deeply inculcated in scholars of OEP, providing
many reasons for optimism about the long term success of this emergent paradigm.
4 Critique
As noted, all paradigms by definition privilege one set of assumptions, methods, and
epistemologies and, by implication, one conception of political economy over others.
Scholars cannot reach agreement that one set of assumptions is likely to prove
productive in building and testing theories, for instance, without necessarily excluding
other possible sets of assumptions. Any approach that is sufficiently capacious to
encompass many possible assumptions is likely to be vacuous or, at least,
indeterminate. For this reason, the stakes of academic debate are often quite high.
Reflecting its status as an emergent paradigm, OEP has been the target of
significant criticism. Critics charge that its conception of interests is too materialist
and too narrow (Keohane 2009; Katzenstein 2009; Farrell and Finnemore 2009), that
it ignores the constitutive (as opposed to regulative) power of institutions
(Katzenstein 2009, 126), and that it disregards structural (as opposed to bargaining)
power in the international economy (Keohane 2009, 39). In its focus on micro-level
and individual incentives, it fails to pay sufficient attention or, worse, is blinded to
big, macro-level changes in the international economy and lacks a synthetic
interpretation of change (Keohane 2009). Leveled by some of the founders of
modern IPE, these are valid criticisms that proponents of OEP need to take seriously.
The first two criticisms—on interests and the constitutive nature of institutions—
are inherent in the paradigm. As above, the hard core assumption of OEP is that
interests are determined largely by a unit’s production profile or position in the
international division of labor. In this way, interests are understood to be thinly
social—in that they are a product of a larger set of social interactions, the
international economy—and largely materialist.23 Deducing interests from the unit’s
23 By thinly social, I mean that interests are not entirely internal to the unit but are not constituted by any
larger, normative or ideational environment. New work seeks to open up the question of interests by
examining how gender, religion, and other attributes interact with a unit’s production profile. Research
shows that religion (Scheve and Stasavage 2006) and gender differences (Burgoon and Hiscox 2003;
Goldstein et al. 2007) are important to how individuals experience or interpret their economic policy
interests. Cross-national surveys of attitudes toward trade, now in progress, promise important insights.
This research enriches but is not inconsistent with the notion of interest otherwise derived from the clear
and distinct predictions of the specific factors and HOS theories.
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position in the international division of labor via established economic theory is the
great innovation and strength of OEP, and perhaps in the eyes of its critics its
greatest weakness. As part of the hard core of the paradigm, however, this
assumption cannot be altered significantly without altering or, indeed, vitiating the
paradigm itself.
Proponents of OEP, I think, are mindful of the inherent limits of this assumption.
There are many dimensions of interests that cannot be derived from the production
profile of an individual or group. Embodying the second and third dimensions of
power (Lukes 1977; Barnett and Duvall 2005), institutions do shape how individuals
or groups conceive of their interests. As descriptions of the real world, these
statements are undoubtedly correct. The question is not whether OEP or any other
theory accurately captures all aspects of the real world, but what empirical
regularities are missed or perhaps incorrectly estimated by the particular theoretical
simplifications employed and, importantly, whether some other approach that does
capture these aspects of reality contains excess empirical content or explains
sufficiently more than OEP to justify the additional theoretical complexity.24 To note
that a theory simplifies and excludes some aspects of reality is a truism. When critics
charge that OEP does not include this or that, the only possible response can be
“Yes, as does any theory or paradigm.” To identify the substantive consequences of
these simplifications and to offer an alterative, more empirically powerful theory is a
considerably harder challenge.
Other criticisms, on structural power and theories of change, can be accommo-
dated, at least in part, within OEP. The criticisms are justified given the current state
of theory, but they do not challenge the hard core of the paradigm. Rather, they offer
interesting new avenues for extending the approach. The root of these criticisms, in
my view, is in the linear conception of politics embedded in OEP which diverts
attention from the feedback effects of decisions taken at the international level on the
constellation of interests and institutions within societies. In an often-cited, still
relevant, but seldom heeded critique, Gourevitch (1978) referred to such effects as
the “second image reversed.” By identifying and relaxing several peripheral
assumptions now made by theorists, OEP can move toward a more dynamic and
politically richer theory. Specifically, by relaxing the small country and constant
returns to scale assumptions of traditional economic theory, and building on the
recursive nature of international institutions, OEP can go some distance toward
incorporating into existing theory structural power, historical contingency, and
political dynamics and, thereby, contribute to our understanding of macro-level
change in the international political economy.
4.1 International Market Power
The issues of structural power and, often, big, macro-level change revolve around
the rise and decline of major industrial and trading states. The supposed decline of
the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of Japan in the same period, or the
24 On the need for any alternative to possess excess empirical content, see Lakatos (1978).
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rise of China in the 21st century all unsettle international economic relations and
should, by implication, be subjects of study in IPE. OEP has, to date, been largely
silent on these changes, but this need not be the case.
OEP typically begins with the “small country” assumption of international
economic theory that production and consumption in any single state are sufficiently
small relative to global totals that all actions, including government policy, have no
noticeable effect on world prices.25 Relaxing this assumption, however, has long
been recognized to open the possibility of welfare-improving government inter-
ventions through import barriers or export restrictions, known collectively as optimal
tariffs. By restricting imports or exports, governments can shift the terms of trade to
their advantage sufficiently to improve their national welfare even at the expense of
global welfare. A contemporary example is Saudi Arabia which by restricting its
production of crude oil raises world prices more than enough to offset the revenue
forgone by not selling all it could produce. Although optimal tariffs have not been a
focus of OEP, in drawing on the same economic theories of interest discussed above,
they are not inconsistent with the basic framework and can be easily incorporated at
the international bargaining stage (Gowa 1994). Indeed, Kyle Bagwell and Robert
Staiger (2002) argue that it is precisely the ambition to cooperate in restraining these
nationally optimal but collectively suboptimal tariffs that motivates the GATT/WTO.
Relaxing the small country assumption and recognizing that countries can act in
ways that affect international prices, however, has two sets of effects that, although
they can be incorporated into OEP, have not yet been theorized or considered at
length. Both suggest that rather than being exogenous to politics, interests are in fact
endogenous and the product of political strategies and manipulations.
First, in addition to reducing global welfare, optimal tariffs and other restrictions
in one country can have important distributional implications in other countries.
Optimal tariffs work by altering international prices. As we know from both the
specific factors and HOS models, shifts in relative prices will affect groups/factors
within countries differently, depending on the structure of comparative advantage.
Groups or factors affected by a decline in the relative price of their goods will suffer
disproportionately. If the effect on international prices is indeed large enough to shift
rents to the home country, this distributional effect may well be substantial.
In the case of oil prices during the first half of 2008, for instance, oil exporting
countries, led by Saudi Arabia, took advantage of tightening market conditions,
largely brought on by the rapid economic growth of China and India, to reduce
production and push real prices back to their historic highs first reached in the late
1970s. This increase harmed the terms of trade for all oil importing countries, but it
inflicted disproportionate harm on countries and industries that use oil relatively
intensively. With traditionally low prices for oil and, thus, a history of profligate
energy usage, higher oil prices affected the American economy more severely than
other advanced industrialized countries. In turn, industries that use energy
intensively, like heavy manufacturing, were harmed more than other sectors. And
industries that produced goods that use energy intensively—like automobiles, and
25 Although typically stated at the country level, the assumption is more accurately framed at the industry
or product level. For most goods most of the time, this assumption may not be unreasonable.
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especially large, fuel inefficient trucks—were devastated, leading to what may be the
final collapse of the American automobile industry. Perhaps even more important
politically, regions within the United States that use energy intensively—the upper
Midwest where winters are cold, the South where summers are hot, and rural areas in
both where commutes tend to be substantially longer in distance—suffered more
than the coastal areas.26 While gasoline prices are higher along the coasts, in those
areas total oil costs average less than five percent of personal income; in rural
counties in the upper Midwest and parts of the South, however, oil can consume up
to 16% of personal income. That the latter are also “Red” leaning states helps
account for the politicization of oil prices and policies in the 2008 presidential
campaign and the resonance for many rank-and-file Republicans of the chant “drill,
baby, drill.” In this case, at least, politically determined international price
movements, though optimal from the viewpoint of oil exporters, had politically
important distributional effects not only between but within other countries as well.
The distributional effects of optimal tariffs on other countries should properly be a
core subject of OEP.
Second, countries may also affect global prices through economically sub-optimal
but politically motivated policies. The distributional effects created by altering world
prices is not limited to “optimal” import or export restrictions. Although the intent is
not to improve national welfare by earning rents at the expense of foreign producers
or consumers, large politically motivated price distortions can have important effects
not only at home but also abroad.
Agricultural policy in the advanced industrialized states, for instance, clearly
distorts international prices in unfortunate ways not only for consumers in those
countries who pay more for food but for producers in other countries who lose
markets for their agricultural goods. In the name of food security, preserving the
family farm, or just plain old special interest politics, virtually every advanced
industrialized democracy subsidizes agriculture. The overproduction of food in
industrialized states leads to fewer imports, and therefore lower demand and prices
for agricultural commodities sold by foreign producers; the dumping of excess
production by industrialized countries, often in the name of “food aid,” further
depresses global prices for foodstuffs. The overproduction of food in industrialized
countries necessarily reduces profits and incentives for production for farmers in
countries that might otherwise specialize in agriculture. It also distorts patterns of
comparative advantage. Given world prices, typically small countries that would
otherwise produce food still specialize in “something,” just not the industry that
“nature” would have selected or that best uses their factor endowments. Rather than
farming, labor and land are put to their next best use, with the former often finding
employment in the bloated services sector.27
26 Clifford Krauss, “Rural U.S. Takes Worst Hit as Gas Tops $4 Average,” New York Times, June 9, 2008.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/09/business/09gas.html?scp=14&sq=oil+price+share+
income&st=nyt. The interactive map is especially interesting.
27 Developing countries bear some responsibility for the distortions in production here as well. Although
resources are driven out of agriculture by artificially low international prices, that they often fail to find a
second best use in another export industry and end up in the service sector or informal economy is likely
the result of distorted policies within the developing country itself.
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The overproduction of food in industrialized countries also has political
implications in developing countries. As resources are driven out of agriculture by
artificially low international prices, the farm sector becomes less politically
important than it would otherwise be, leading to further distortions in public policy.
The effects of these agricultural price distortions are evident in the failure of the
Doha Round of the WTO. Clearly, states that would benefit from agricultural trade
liberalization are engaging in hard bargaining with the aim of opening up
industrialized country markets, and are willing to run some risk of bargaining
failure to maximize their leverage. But equally important, the agricultural producers
who would otherwise be forces for liberalization within their own developing
economies are artificially diminished (or do not exist at all) and cannot play the role
of counterweight to the comparatively disadvantaged sectors (usually manufactur-
ing) that demand continued protection. As the result of biased international prices,
developing country farmers cannot bring enough pressure to bear on industrialized
countries directly to change their policies, but they also cannot produce liberalization
in other products at home to induce the developed countries to make further
concessions either. By insisting on protecting their own farmers, the advanced
industrialized countries are disarming and undermining politically the most
important forces for liberalization in developing markets.
The profound effects of policy-induced price distortions on “foreign” interests is
best observed, I think, in Britain’s much analyzed repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846—
an actual case where these distortions were eventually removed. At that time, trade
policy in the United States was essentially split along sectional lines (see James and
Lake 1989). The Northeast, dominated by nascent manufacturers, was strongly
protectionist. The South, dependent on British markets for cotton and tobacco, was
steadfastly free trade. The Midwest, rapidly growing and searching for markets for
its wheat, corn, and other agricultural products, was the swing voting bloc. With the
British market closed against its goods, the Midwest threw its weight behind the
Northeast protectionists, hoping to stimulate increased domestic specialization
according to internal comparative advantage. This was not the region’s preferred
policy, but a clear second or third best choice. Once Britain repealed its Corn Laws,
however, the Midwest swung immediately into a free trade coalition with the South
and ushered in a 15 year period of trade liberalization broken only by the Civil War.
Indeed, it was not by coincidence that, although the bill had been marked up in
committee months earlier, debate in the House of Representatives on the liberal
Walker Tariff began the very day Congress received official notification of Britain’s
historic repeal. The prospect of new markets in the world’s then largest industrial
power transformed the politics of American trade policy.
By taking international prices as exogenous, OEP is blinded to these indirect or
feedback effects on politics and policies in other countries. Tariffs need not be
optimal to have profound effects not only on those who choose to use them but on
the targets of these policies as well. Scholars of OEP need to be far more attentive to
the general effects of policy-induced price distortions, and doing so first requires
shedding the simplistic assumption that no country can affect international demand
and supply. This form of structural power, as critics term it, matters. As noted above,
both dependency theory and hegemonic stability theory, and the concerns that gave
rise to these approaches, resonate with contemporary attempts to theorize more
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rigorously about how national actions affect relative prices and how these prices, in
turn, alter domestic interests and policy. Although these prior analytic frameworks
failed to mature into sound theory, this earlier work may yet prove to be fertile soil
for new models of how international power matters in IPE.
4.2 Increasing Returns to Scale
In ways similar to the rise and fall of countries above, concerns with structural power
and economic dynamics relate to changes in the structure of comparative advantage,
and especially the rise of new industries with large economies of scale and,
therefore, geographic agglomeration. OEP is premised almost entirely on the
assumption, common to both specific factors and HOS trade theory, that all
production is characterized by constant returns to scale (a doubling of inputs, for
instance, leads to a doubling of output). This implies, in turn, that countries will
engage in inter-industry trade, sometimes referred to as “North-South” trade to
emphasize differences in factor endowments. Yet, depending on how one classifies
goods, one-quarter or more of international exchange is comprised of intra-industry
trade, or trade within the same product categories.28 Economists have developed
sophisticated models of increasing returns to production (a doubling of inputs leads
to more than a doubling of output) or economies of scale (EoS) to explain the
modern burst of intra-industry trade. Such models show that even with identical
factor endowments, technology, and consumer tastes, trade between countries will
still occur. Internal EoS (specific to the firm) lead to imperfect competition
(monopoly or monopolistic competition) and international trade in similar products,
while external EoS (specific to the industry) may or may not produce complete
specialization (depending on initial country size). Although not a subject of
significant research, allowing for variations in the returns to scale is entirely
consistent with OEP and can be incorporated into existing theory, but often with
surprising implications.
For the political economy of trade, the most important implication of EoS
production is that the pattern of specialization and, thus, any distributional effects are
indeterminate. In a world of increasing returns to scale in which countries possess
identical factor endowments, for instance, specialization will still occur but is
entirely dependent on random perturbations. Similarly, small differences in country
size may lead to decisive differences in who specializes in what. In an important
unpublished paper, the most serious attempt to examine the distributional
implications of EoS trade of which I am aware, Rogowski (1996) deduces that
political cleavages and conflict are likely to arise between increasing and constant
returns to scale industries, between traded and non-traded goods producers, and (if
assets are specific to an industry or even “sticky”) between active workers and
retirees/consumers, regions, and possibly ethnic groups within countries. The
political battles, moreover, will be fought over social welfare policy, industrial
policy, immigration and foreign investment policies, political institutions, imperial-
ism (size of country) and supranationalism (regionalism, customs unions, etc.). Yet,
28 Skeptics argue that what appears to be intra-industry trade is simply an artifact of an antiquated and
inappropriate system of classification of traded goods.
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how these cleavages arise and battles unfold in any single country depend on
random initial conditions or shocks anywhere in the world that advantage producers
in one country relative to others. Similarly, Kerry Chase (2005) and Helen Milner
(1997a) argue that EoS industries are a driving force behind regional trade
liberalization, but this too is highly contingent on the optimal size of firms and the
arbitrary sizes of the countries within the region (as a proxy for consumer demand).
Given the sensitivity of outcomes to initial conditions, government policy may
also have a significant effect—the “created” comparative advantage behind
industrial policy (Johnson 1982; Zysman and Tyson 1983). Governments may seek
to protect a firm/industry now disadvantaged by an arbitrary but decisive “shock.”
Or they may try to seize competitive advantages over other possible producers, a
branch of inquiry that developed into “strategic trade theory” (Brander and Spencer
1985; Krugman 1986). In a variant of the traditional infant industry argument,
strategic trade theory demonstrated that governments could in principle subsidize
production sufficiently in its initial stages to gain a permanent cost and locational
advantage for industries with increasing returns to scale. In either case, once we
admit that government policy can affect the pattern of specialization, we must
recognize that interests—the foundation of any OEP analysis—are themselves
politically-induced phenomena.
For EoS trade, at least, interests can no longer be taken as exogenous to politics
but may actually be the product of international politics. The pattern of comparative
advantage and production in open economies is not set by factor endowments that
are relatively slow to change, but by initial conditions combined with both chance
and government policy. Explicating fully the distributional implications of EoS trade
will be essential to further theoretical and empirical progress in OEP. If the
distributional implications are as sensitive to initial conditions and actions by
governments as current theory suggests, future OEP analyses will have to focus
much more fully on the contingent, path dependent factors long emphasized by more
historically oriented scholars. Importantly, however, a new focus on EoS industries
will help OEP capture more elements of structural power and industrial dynamics in
the international economy seen as both missing and central by its critics.
4.3 The Power of International Institutions
As we have seen, OEP expects international institutions to play a key role in
facilitating cooperation and, more importantly for this critique, structuring the
bargaining between states. They are part of the third link in a one-way causal chain
that starts with interests, moves through domestic institutions, and ends with
international bargaining. This is seen most clearly, perhaps, in the so-called
Schelling conjecture, which suggests that domestic constraints improve a leader’s
bargaining strength abroad. As Robert Putnam (1988) and Helen Milner (1997b)
have shown, domestic interests and institutions do affect international bargaining and
cooperation. But these examples also make plain that the levels of OEP are typically
assumed to cumulate in one direction—from interests to institutions to international
bargaining. Yet, if international institutions really matter, they will alter the interests
and possibly institutions within states as well. This feedback from the international
political economy to the domestic arena is now almost entirely ignored in OEP, but
Open economy politics: a critical review 237
need not be.29 Indeed, in a way fully consistent with the core assumptions of the
paradigm, international institutions may actually create an important endogenous
dynamic with important effects on politics.
In structuring the bargaining between states, institutions favor one state over
another, of course, but may also favor selected interests in those states over other
interests. Even when simply facilitating cooperation international institutions can
benefit particular groups within states while harming others. By creating “winners”
and “losers” from particular outcomes, international institutions privilege and reward
some countries and groups and harm others. In ways similar to optimal tariffs, the
effects of international phenomena on domestic groups can be quite significant.
While unfavorable international policies might be expected to compel domestic
losers to fight harder, the losers are in reality weakened further by these outcomes.
Presumably, when faced with the prospect of political defeat, the losers have already
done all they desired or could to forestall this result. Ex post, they would likely make
the same choices, on average. But once burdened with unfavorable policies, the
income of the group will fall and its resources will contract; this reduces further
incentives for new investments in the enterprise and increases incentives to invest in
or migrate to new industries, exacerbating the initial result. Depending on the degree
of asset specificity, depreciation rates, and transactions costs, this process of asset
reallocation from disfavored to favored policy areas will be faster or slower, but in
the face of unfavorable policies the resources and political clout of the losers will
inevitably decline relative to the resources and political power of the winners
(Rogowski 1989).
This rebalancing of political forces is clearly evident in the “creative destruction,”
as Joseph Schumpeter described technological change in another context, of the
current international free trade regime embodied in the WTO. As an organization
founded and designed to promote free trade, the rules of the WTO clearly benefit
some groups over others, as highlighted in the continuing controversy over the
institution. By opening markets, limiting the types of protection that can be used to
bolster declining industries, explicitly creating reciprocity in market access, and
excluding most environmental and social considerations from the agenda, the WTO
favors the abundant factors of production and the comparatively advantaged sectors
in each country. Over time, in turn, free trade has systematically harmed scarce
factors of production and shrunk their political strength, as witnessed by the
declining labor movements of most industrialized countries; correspondingly,
comparatively disadvantaged industries have slowly disappeared, as in the footwear
industry in North America, once a vibrant force in the protectionist coalition. In this
way, the WTO and the free trade regime it supports have fundamentally reshaped the
economic and political structures of its members in ways that expand and strengthen
groups supportive of free trade and shrink and weaken the forces of protectionism
(Hathaway 1998). Since the structure of comparative advantage continues to evolve,
new groups are always thrust into the protectionist fringe, but the political equipoise
within many countries has been decisively turned over time in ways that reinforce
the initial bias in policy towards free trade. As a result of this evolution, the
29 For an exception, see Davis (2003).
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constellation of interests in North America, Europe, and Japan over trade policy is
vastly different today from that in the 1960s and 1970s.
This dynamic reshaping of interests is an inevitable if under-appreciated
byproduct of the fact that international institutions do matter in world politics. To
the extent that institutions bias policy in particular directions, and that bias has
distributional implications for different groups, the structure of interests within
societies must change as well. The example of trade is likely to be replicated in all
areas of IPE, and possibly beyond in other institutionalized arenas. If so, the
composition of interests within a society at any given time is not independent of the
international institutions created and promoted at some previous moment. The longer
the period under examination, moreover, the more likely the interests at play will
themselves be the product of prior institutional choices. OEP now treats societal
interests as exogenous and, thus, constitute the “ultimate” independent variable. The
more international institutions matter for politics, the less helpful the “linear”
treatment of politics will be. Nonetheless, by linking institutional effects to changes
in international prices, as with trade openness, we can still predict with some degree
of clarity who will win from particular policies and who will lose, and how this will
affect the political strength of the groups over time. That there is feedback from
institutions on interests makes the analytic task harder, but connecting this to
international price effects is likely to still yield important insights.
4.4 Implications
All three of these critiques challenge the notion that interests, the fundamental
building block of OEP, are fixed and exogenous, or can be safely treated as such.
Each suggests that interests are themselves political constructs, the product of some
past or present set of political choices. The importance of these feedback effects
suggests the need within OEP for a less linear view of politics and a more general
rather than partial equilibrium view of theory and testing.
More important, however, by relaxing peripheral assumptions on country size and
returns to scale, and attending to the distributional implications of international
institutions and policy outcomes more generally, OEP has the tools to address
concerns with structural power and economic dynamics that lie at the center of many
of the criticisms leveled at the emergent paradigm. It remains to be seen whether
these tools can address adequately issues of power and change, or whether some
other approach might prove superior. The critics raise important concerns that can,
hopefully, stimulate new and important directions for research in OEP and, more
generally, IPE.
5 Conclusion
In three short decades, but a moment in academic time, IPE has grown into a true
interdiscipline, combining some of the best of political science and economics,
centered on a emergent paradigm that structures knowledge, generates puzzles, and
identifies areas likely to yield profitable future research. Despite its successes, OEP
is not perfect. As indicated, many refinements and extensions are possible and,
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indeed, required in the years ahead. Nonetheless, OEP is a powerful approach that
still promises future rewards. By working within broadly shared assumptions,
methods, and epistemologies, scholars have built better and more refined theories,
tested and accepted or rejected specific hypotheses, created new and more
theoretically appropriate measures of key theoretical constructs, and produced better
causal explanations of a variety of international economic policies. We understand
the causes of trade, capital market, migration, and foreign investment policies better
today than even a decade or two ago.
In my view, OEP is a model approach for the study of international institutions
more generally. As noted, interests filtered through the structure of international
prices and deduced from economic theory are key to OEP’s success as an
explanatory framework. Other approaches lack clear theories of interests, as do
many issue areas other than the economy. As a result, in many studies of
international institutions, interests are often treated in an arbitrary or inductive
manner and produce, at best, propositions that are hard to falsify. This is true not
only of earlier, more functional theories of international regimes (Keohane 1984),
but also of more recent models of institutional design (Goldstein et al. 2001;
Koremenos et al. 2003). Rather than building ever more sophisticated models of
institutions per se, scholars of security, the environment, human rights and other
important substantive topics might be better served by developing theories of and
focusing attention on the interests of actors.
By placing international institutions into a broader theory of politics, OEP is also
better able to specify how, when, and why such institutions affect the play of politics
within and between countries than more narrowly drawn theories. OEP has generated
important insights into how international institutions enhance the credibility of
international agreements, influence bargaining between states, and even alter the
interests of individuals, groups, and states. Many of the insights about international
institutions from OEP have been generalized to other issue areas, especially on the
important role of international institutions in enhancing the credibility of agreements.
Nonetheless, debate continues on the extent to which international institutions “matter,”
especially in security affairs (Mearsheimer 1994; but see Haftendorn et al. 1999).
Ultimately, this debate can only be resolved by general theories that identify the actors
and their interests, address the role of domestic institutions in aggregating those social
forces, specify the bargaining process between states and how international institutions
modify outcomes from what we would expect from a pure “power politics”
perspective, and, of course, endogenize the feedback effects from institutions and
other international factors on the fundamental building block of interests.
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